Mark Scheme (Pre-Standardisation)

Summer 2024

Pearson Edexcel in
GCE History (9HI0/2D)
Advanced

Paper 2: Depth study

Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830–70

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

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General Marking Guidance

- All candidates must receive the same treatment. Examiners must mark the first candidate in exactly the same way as they mark the last.
- Mark schemes should be applied positively. Candidates must be rewarded for what they have shown they can do rather than penalised for omissions.
- Examiners should mark according to the mark scheme not according to their perception of where the grade boundaries may lie.
- There is no ceiling on achievement. All marks on the mark scheme should be used appropriately.
- All the marks on the mark scheme are designed to be awarded. Examiners should always award full marks if deserved, i.e. if the answer matches the mark scheme. Examiners should also be prepared to award zero marks if the candidate's response is not worthy of credit according to the mark scheme.
- Where some judgement is required, mark schemes will provide the principles by which marks will be awarded and exemplification may be limited.
- When examiners are in doubt regarding the application of the mark scheme to a candidate's response, the team leader must be consulted.
- Crossed out work should be marked UNLESS the candidate has replaced it with an alternative response.

How to award marks when level descriptions are used

1. Finding the right level

The first stage is to decide which level the answer should be placed in. To do this, use a 'best-fit' approach, deciding which level most closely describes the quality of the answer. Answers can display characteristics from more than one level, and where this happens markers must use the guidance below and their professional judgement to decide which level is most appropriate.

For example, one stronger passage at L4 would not by itself merit a L4 mark, but it might be evidence to support a high L3 mark, unless there are substantial weaknesses in other areas. Similarly, an answer that fits best in L3 but which has some characteristics of L2 might be placed at the bottom of L3. An answer displaying some characteristics of L3 and some of L1 might be placed in L2.

2. Finding a mark within a level

After a level has been decided on, the next stage is to decide on the mark within the level. The instructions below tell you how to reward responses within a level. However, where a level has specific guidance about how to place an answer within a level, always follow that guidance.

Levels containing two marks only

Start with the presumption that the work will be at the top of the level. Move down to the lower mark if the work only just meets the requirements of the level.

Levels containing three or more marks

Markers should be prepared to use the full range of marks available in a level and not restrict marks to the middle. Markers should start at the middle of the level (or the upper-middle mark if there is an even number of marks) and then move the mark up or down to find the best mark. To do this, they should take into account how far the answer meets the requirements of the level:

- If it meets the requirements *fully*, markers should be prepared to award full marks within the level. The top mark in the level is used for answers that are as good as can realistically be expected within that level
- If it only *barely* meets the requirements of the level, markers should consider awarding marks at the bottom of the level. The bottom mark in the level is used for answers that are the weakest that can be expected within that level
- The middle marks of the level are used for answers that have a *reasonable* match to the descriptor. This might represent a balance between some characteristics of the level that are fully met and others that are only barely met.

Indicative content

Examiners are reminded that indicative content is provided as an illustration to markers of some of the material that may be offered by students. It does not show required content and alternatives should be credited where valid.

Generic Level Descriptors: Section A

Target: AO2: Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within its historical context.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	**1–3**	• Demonstrates surface level comprehension of the source material without analysis, selecting some material relevant to the question, but in the form of direct quotations or paraphrases. • Some relevant contextual knowledge is included, with limited linkage to the source material. • Evaluation of the source material is assertive with little or no supporting evidence. Concepts of reliability or utility may be addressed, but by making stereotypical judgements.
2	**4–7**	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the source material by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand, confirm or challenge matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry but with limited support for judgement. Concepts of reliability or utility are addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and judgements may be based on questionable assumptions.
3	**8–12**	• Demonstrates understanding of the source material and shows some analysis by selecting key points relevant to the question, explaining their meaning and selecting material to support valid inferences. • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to explain or support inferences as well as to expand, confirm or challenge matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry and explanation of utility takes into account relevant considerations such as nature or purpose of the source material or the position of the author. Judgements are based on valid criteria but with limited justification.
4	**13–16**	• Analyses the source material, interrogating the evidence to make reasoned inferences and to show a range of ways the material can be used, for example by distinguishing between information and claim or opinion, although treatment of the two sources may be uneven. • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to illuminate and/or discuss the limitations of what can be gained from the content of the source material, displaying some understanding of the need to interpret source material in the context of the values and concerns of the society from which it is drawn. • Evaluation of the source material uses valid criteria which are justified and applied, although some of the evaluation may be weakly substantiated. Evaluation takes into account the weight the evidence will bear as part of coming to a judgement.
5	**17–20**	• Interrogates the evidence of both sources with confidence and discrimination, making reasoned inferences and showing a range of ways the material can be used, for example by distinguishing between information and claim or opinion. • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to illuminate and/ or discuss the limitations of what can be gained from the content of the source material, displaying secure understanding of the need to interpret source material in the context of the values and concerns of the society from which it is drawn. • Evaluation of the source material uses valid criteria which are justified and fully applied. Evaluation takes into account the weight the evidence will bear as part of coming to a judgement and, where appropriate, distinguishes between the degree of certainty with which aspects of it can be used as the basis for claims.

Section B

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	**1–3**	• Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. • Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. • The overall judgement is missing or asserted. • There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	**4–7**	• There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. • An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. • The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	**8–12**	• There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. • Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. • The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
4	**13–16**	• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. • The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
5	**17–20**	• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement. • The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.

Section A: indicative content

Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830–70

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate Cavour's response to Garibaldi's expedition to the south in 1860. **Source 1** 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The letters were written by Cavour and so give a clear indication of Cavour's thoughts on the 1860 expedition • The letters were written at the time the events under investigation were happening • As a close friend of Cavour, Cavour could be frank about the situation with Nigra but, as a representative of Cavour in France, Cavour was also indicating his public response to events. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about Cavour's response to Garibaldi's expedition to the south in 1860: • It claims that Cavour is working tirelessly to prevent Garibaldi's expedition being successful ('doing everything possible', 'everything in my power', 'Yesterday, I gave…orders to stop Garibaldi's ships') • It claims that Cavour is not actually working with Garibaldi to capture the south ('We are not conspiring with Garibaldi') • It suggests that Cavour may have lost control of events ('disappointed… taken place', 'in no condition to deal with', 'My only hope') and indicates that he is fearful for the future ('save us from revolution') • It suggests that Cavour is willing to be ruthless in his response ('the King must not receive the crown', 'take over the government', 'snatch out of Garibaldi's hands'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • In 1860, Garibaldi, heartbroken by events at Villafranca and the loss of his birthplace, Nice, to France, was determined to find a cause that would reinvigorate Italian unity. The Sicilian uprising occurred in April 1860 • Cavour had to be mindful of both ongoing events in the north, including the Piedmontese elections and the role of the French, and the generally positive relationship between Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel • There were suggestions in Italy and Europe that Cavour was publicly indignant over events, while working secretly with Garibaldi to further Victor Emmanuel's leadership of a united Italy • Cavour was particularly worried about the potential for Garibaldi to invade the mainland; although Garibaldi proclaimed unity under Victor Emmanuel, many of his followers were republicans.

Question	Indicative content
	Source 2 1.The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The author was a political opponent of Cavour and, from the tone of the language, clearly a supporter of Garibaldi • The pamphlet was written purposefully to put a negative light on the actions of Cavour, but the fact that it was banned might also suggest that there is some truth in what was being written. • The pamphlet was published at the time of the events and the commentary was clearly written while the invasion of Sicily was ongoing. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about Cavour's response to Garibaldi's expedition to the south in 1860: • It uses language that suggests Cavour's response to the expedition was vindictive and emotive ('spoke brutally', 'strenuously opposed', 'passionately desired…failure', 'diminishing…brilliancy', 'plotting…stirs') • It claims that Cavour had taken practical measures to prevent the expedition reaching Sicily ('Cavour had Garibaldi's heroic group pursued by Piedmontese naval ships…representatives…to prevent the invasion.') • It indicates that Cavour is actively trying to prevent Garibaldi taking Naples ('raises a fresh obstacle', 'plotting with… the Bourbon government') • It suggests that Cavour is striving to prevent Garibaldi's success for his own motives ('to make Italy as he wants it to be.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • Cavour was privately convinced that the expedition could not succeed – he refused to provide arms for the expedition and made plans with the navy to try to intercept the 'Thousand' before they reached Sicily • Cavour sent Farini as a representative to both Sicily and Naples in an attempt to hinder Garibaldi's actions • Cavour used a variety of methods to prevent Garibaldi from reaching Naples, including a letter from Victor Emmanuel commanding Garibaldi to desist, a blockade of ships from Sicily and plotting a coup d'etat in Naples • Cavour's vision of the pace and nature of Italian unification differed greatly from Garibaldi's; in 1860, Garibaldi was determined ultimately to complete unification by taking Rome, which was Cavour's greatest fear. **Sources 1 and 2** The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • Both Sources were written at about the same time, but Source 1 gives a personal account of Cavour's response to events and Source 2 provides an opponent's view • Both agree that Cavour used the navy in attempting to prevent Garibaldi reaching Sicily, and that Cavour was determined to prevent Garibaldi reaching Naples • Source 1 implies that Cavour was selflessly working for Italy and Victor Emmanuel, while Source 2 implies that his response was selfishly for his own political ends • Both Sources suggest that Cavour needed to take into consideration the French reaction to events.

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to investigate reasons for the success of German counter-revolutions in the years 1848–49. **Source 3** 1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The fact that a letter so critical of the revolution in Berlin was published in a newspaper supportive of the events of the revolution suggests that there may be some truth in what is being claimed • The purpose of the letter is clearly to outline grievances while the revolutions are still ongoing, and so give an indication of immediate challenges to the revolutions • The letter claims to come from a specific group of peasants in West Prussia and so may only be indicative of problems with and/or facing the revolutionaries in one specific revolution – that in Prussia. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about reasons for the success of German counter-revolutions in the years 1848–49: • It claims that the revolutionaries are corrupt ('villains…plundered the…treasury.') and that Berlin is under physical threat from regional peasants ('24 May…attacked in a hundred places at once.') • It implies that the peasants of West Prussia felt exploited by the revolutionaries ('not going to feed you any more') and suggests that the Prussian King might be able to harness their anger ('will come to his help') • The use of language implies peasant contempt for the revolutionaries ('your stinking city', 'You are always talking big', 'Your city of robbers' caves') • It suggests that not all ordinary people were welcoming or supportive of the revolutionary movements sweeping Germany at the time ('we peasants will make you regret following…those tricksters in France.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • The revolutionary movements were essentially urban phenomena that failed to address the concerns of the largely rural populations of the German states, creating resentment and discontent • The German peasantry were renowned for their conservatism and were broadly supportive of the monarchical rulers of the German states • Peasant violence was a feature of the destabilisation and overthrow of the German revolutions, e.g. in Prussia, in the declining fortunes of the Frankfurt Assembly • The situation in West Prussia was very specific and complex. German nationalism in conflict with Polish nationalism led to violent confrontations that the peasantry blamed on the new government in Berlin.

Question	Indicative content
	Source 4 1.The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences: • The purpose of the message was to give a formal account of counter-revolutionary events from the point of view of those who carried out the events to their superiors in the Austrian government • The message was sent very soon after the counter-revolutionary events occurred while still fresh in the mind • The tone of the message suggests that Major Huyn was unsympathetic to liberal revolution. 2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about reasons for the success of German counter-revolutions in the years 1848–49: • It implies that the base of the elected Parliament was easily taken control of by the Austrian army ('march into the castle.', 'based in the barracks. They were strong enough in number to secure the gates of the town') • It indicates that the Austrian government had a well organised plan to shut down the elected Parliament and resume full power in Austria ('agreed command', 'only one way in', 'new constitutional manifesto') • It suggests that the revolutionaries and elected members of Parliament were easily subdued ('all accepted the situation.') and even divided ('A few Members were pleased, others bitterly angry') • It claims that the deployment of military strength was sufficient to bring down a revolutionary assembly ('Power has made its impression.'). 3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include: • At the onset of revolution, most of the German rulers removed themselves from the turmoil of revolutionary activity or compromised, so giving themselves the time and opportunity to plan a counter-revolution • Most of the revolutionary governments had no military organisation to protect their position, and the national Frankfurt Assembly had to rely on the Prussian army when dealing with external problems • The German counter-revolutions were successful because of the use of military force, often from Austria or Prussia, including the final dissolution of the Frankfurt Assembly • Disagreements, and often incompetent leadership, meant that the new revolutionary governments were often riven with internal division and soon folded when faced with military forces. **Sources 3 and 4** The following points could be made about the sources in combination: • Both Sources are written from the viewpoint of opponents of the revolutionaries • Source 3 reflects counter-revolutionary views from those 'below', while Source 4 reflects the counter-revolutionary views of those from 'above' • Both Sources were written during the ongoing events of the revolutions • Both Sources provide a sense that the revolutionaries were ineffectual in power.

Section B: indicative content

Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830–70

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that, in the years 1830-58, Italian liberals and nationalists had as much success as they had failure. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1830–58, Italian liberals and nationalists had much success should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • In 1830–31, Italian revolutionaries were able to stage revolutions in several states, which required the intervention of Austrian forces to put down • In the 1830s and 1840s, nationalist ideas underpinned the cultural developments of the *Risorgimento* and inspired new-found belief in the concept of a united Italy • In the 1840s, the growth of liberalism persuaded the rulers of several Italian states to contemplate constitutional and political reforms, e.g. Pope Pius IX in the Papal States, Charles Albert in Piedmont • Revolutions spread across the whole of the Italian peninsula in 1848–49 and were initially very successful, particularly with the establishment of the Mazzinian republic in Rome and the Venetian republic under Manin • In 1848–49, Piedmont became the state most likely to lead Italy to unity, with Charles Albert's agreement to the *Statuto* and his declaration of the First War of Independence from Austria • Post-1849, many Italian nationalists came to accept Piedmont as the likely leader of a united Italy. In 1857, the National Society was formed and began to establish a relationship with Cavour, particularly in 1858. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1830–58, Italian liberals and nationalists had more failure than success should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The 1830–31 revolutions were limited in extent, were undermined by a lack of co-operation between states and were easily put down by force by the Austrian army • In the 1830s and 1840s, nationalists and liberals struggled to make ground in the face of a lack of popular support and severe repression. Radical groups were not helped by the secret nature of their organisations • The 1848–49 revolutions were ultimately a failure, with all the previous rulers or dynasties returning to power, often aided by Austrian military might • The hope invested in Pope Pius IX by the liberals and Giobertian nationalists in 1846 was short-lived, as he became reactionary in his response to the Roman Republic and denounced the War of Independence • Italian popular liberalism was particularly affected by the failures of 1848–49. The constitutions that emerged in some states, including the *Statuto*, were limited and 'liberalism' became the politics of the elites • Mazzinian nationalism was all but destroyed by his failures in leadership and the failure of the 1848–49 revolutions to unite Italy. By 1858, many of his followers looked to Victor Emmanuel, including Garibaldi. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
4	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that, in the years 1861–70, internal factors were a greater obstacle to the consolidation of the Kingdom of Italy than were external factors. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1861–70, internal factors were a greater obstacle to the consolidation of the Kingdom of Italy than were external factors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The domestic policy of 'Piedmontisation' caused resentment in those regions that had been brought under control by annexation or through 'plebiscites'; government was often perceived as elitist and corrupt • In the south, resentment of Piedmont developed into the 'Brigands' War'; a brutal civil war encouraged by the Bourbon government-in-exile in Rome, which brought disruption internally and disapproval internationally • The unwillingness of the Pope to give up his temporal power over Rome, and his forthright criticism of Victor Emmanuel and the new Kingdom, weakened the legitimacy of the new state in the eyes of many Italians • The relative underdevelopment and financial situation in the south, relative to the north, meant that the new Kingdom faced difficult economic circumstances • The regionalism of Italy and a culture of parochialism meant that it would take some time for the new Kingdom to create a clear Italian identity • External factors aided the consolidation of the Kingdom; Britain was a supporter of Italian unity under a constitutional monarchy and Prussia was crucial in uniting Venetia (1866) and Rome (1870) under Italy. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1861–70, external factors were a greater obstacle to the consolidation of the Kingdom of Italy than were internal factors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Austria remained in control of Venetia until 1866. Austria, therefore, had to be considered in the foreign policy decisions of the new Italy • A French garrison remained stationed in Rome 'protecting' the Pope until 1870; such a physical presence on 'Italian soil' meant that Italian foreign policy and, even domestic policy, had to consider the French response • The existence of '*irredenta*' territories, such as Venetia and Nice, meant that Victor Emmanuel was under constant pressure to bring them 'into' the new Kingdom, particularly from Garibaldi • The 'occupation' of Rome by the French was seen by many as depriving the Kingdom of its true capital, so undermining the legitimacy of Victor Emmanuel and weakening the new state • Internally, the north was essentially stable throughout the period and Italy established itself as a nation-state with a constitutional monarchy, representative government and legal and administrative structures. Other relevant material must be credited.

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Question	Indicative content
5	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about whether economic factors were more significant than political factors in explaining the declining power of Austria in Germany in the years 1852–66. Arguments and evidence that economic factors were more significant than political factors in explaining the declining power of Austria in Germany in the years 1852–66 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The financial cost of overcoming the 1848 revolutions put Austria in severe debt, so weakening its ability to develop a strong economy to underpin the restoration of its political power • In trade, both the rejection by other German states of Austrian attempts to create a Customs Union and Austrian exclusion from the *Zollverein* were fundamental factors in Austria's declining power • The Austrian Emperor had little interest in economic matters or investing in the economic infrastructure of Austria, so hampering Austrian economic development • Prussian consolidation and growth of its economic power created a rival power base for influence over Germany. The Prussian economy flourished and developed in stark contrast to that of Austria • It was Prussian investment in the arms industry and railways that was the decisive factor in Austrian defeat in the Seven Weeks' War; rapid mobilisation and superior arms overcame greater troop numbers • Until defeat in the Seven Weeks' War, Austria, as head of the German Confederation, remained the preeminent political power in Germany. Most German states sided with Austria at the outbreak of war in 1866. Arguments and evidence that political factors were more significant than economic factors in explaining the declining power of Austria in Germany in the years 1852–66 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Austrian leaders were not as influential as they had been in the past. The death of Prince Schwarzenberg in 1852 saw a consolidation of absolutist rule and reactionary government under Emperor Franz Joseph • Austrian attempts to create *Mittel-Europa* - a *Grossdeutschland* solution to the German question encompassing all of Germany and the Habsburg territories – failed, having been met with suspicion by the German states • After the appointment of Bismarck as Minister-President of Prussia in 1862, Prussia began to challenge the political power of Austria, particularly over Austrian plans to reform the German Confederation • Austria's international 'great power' status was being challenged by its diplomatic and military failures, e.g. the Crimean War, the 1859 war with Italy, at a time when Prussian international status was growing • The Austrian economy was not in terminal decline and saw healthy growth during the period, and Prussia was not in total economic control of the German states, e.g. French trade treaty negotiations, 1863. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
6	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the accuracy of the statement that, in the years 1866–67, Prussia achieved complete domination over Germany. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1866–67, Prussia achieved complete domination over Germany should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The defeat of Austria, and the subsequent Treaty of Prague, acknowledged that Prussia was now the preeminent German power, with *de facto* dominance over a *Kleindeutschland* and recognised as such internationally • Prussia annexed the majority of the northern German states that had fought with Austria in the Seven Weeks' War • Prussia dominated the North German Confederation, initially as a military alliance (1866), and, in 1867, as a fully-constituted federal state, with a Prussian head of state and Chancellor • In 1867, Prussia created a formal *Zollparlament* for decisions concerning the *Zollverein*, which included representatives from the southern German states. This effectively established German economic unity under Prussia • Prussia signed a series of military treaties with the south German states (August 1866) in which Prussia guaranteed the security of southern Germany • Bismarck's rapprochement with the National Liberals brought their support across the German states in the advancement of Prussian interests. Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1866–67, Prussia did not achieve complete domination over Germany should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • In the immediate aftermath of the 1866 war, there was immense resentment and anger in the annexed states over Prussian actions. This resonated in the representative bodies of the Confederation and *Zollverein* • The North German Confederation was a federal not a unitary state, and the rulers of the independent states, e.g. Saxony, were determined to retain their independence and influence • The *Zollparlament* unexpectedly proved to be a source of challenge to Prussian dominance, particularly from representatives of the southern states • The four major southern states of Germany remained governmentally independent, providing the potential for a rival German power bloc • The National Liberals found it difficult to gain support for their desire for a full *Kleindeutschland* unification and German regionalism, particularly in the Catholic South, remained suspicious of Prussian influence. Other relevant material must be credited.

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